India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) has been hailed as one of the country's most creative social initiatives. Since the program was begun only recently (in 2004-05) there is a need to assess its impact on households not just in one year but over time.
I. Introduction
There is high incidence of both open unemployment and poverty in rural India. According to the 61 st Round Household data from the National Sample Survey 8.3 percent of male workers and 7.5 percent of female workers were unemployed in rural India in 2004-05. This fact, along with a high incidence of poverty in rural India (28.7 percent in 2004-05) indicates the high relevance of using a well designed workfare program to address the twin problems of high poverty and high unemployment in the rural sector.
When the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act came into effect in November, 2005 it was hailed as one of India's most creative social initiatives. The act guarantees 100 days of employment a year to at least one member of any rural household who is willing to perform unskilled labor for the minimum wage. By combining rural development with livelihood protection, the work is designed to develop infrastructure such as roads, irrigation and flood protection measures. Beginning with the poorest 200 districts, NREGA became a nationwide program in April, 2008 .
During its first year of operation National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) involved an expenditure of $4.5 billion and was expected to generate 2 billion days of employment. NREGS's performance is also crucial to the success of the Millennium Development Goal of halving global poverty by 2015. NREGS has recently been extended to cover all districts of India. In the budget of 2010-11 expense earmarked for NREG was Rs. 401 billion (>$8 billion).
Against this backdrop it is important to ask both how much benefits have accrued from this program to eligible workers and whether these benefits have persisted over time. The first issue can be addressed using household level cross section data and some dimensions have been addressed in a series of papers (Jha et al. 2010 a, for employment and b, for nutritional impact). The second issue can only be addressed using household level panel data to track the movement of workers in and out of employment in the NREGS.
This paper uses a unique data set for two years, 2007-08 and 2009-10 , for the state of Rajasthan in India to address this question. The plan of this paper is as follows. In section II we discuss the sources of data, section III constructs the results of 2007-8 with those for 2009-10 and describes the movement of workers in and out of NREGS. Section IV models the determinants of such transitions; section V analyzes the dynamics of participation and exit from the NREGS. Section VI concludes.
II. Data
The present analysis is based on primary household level panel survey data from Rajasthan for years 2007-08 and 2009-10 . The modus operandi for collecting the data from household survey in the year 2007-08 was as follows. A list of Rajasthan NREGS districts 2 was compiled. From these districts, three were selected on the basis of probability proportional to size (in this case, rural population as reported in the 2001 Census). In the next stage, a total of twenty five villages were randomly chosen from districts selected in the previous stage. Finally, from each selected village, twenty households were again randomly selected giving us a sample of 500 households in Rajasthan. In 2009-10 also, a total of 500 households were sampled. However, only 476 households were panel (those are common in both the years). The remaining 24 households were different. One of the reasons for those missing households is that some NREGS villages in 2007-08 were no longer NREGS villages in 2009-10.
Thus, our analysis is based on a panel of 476 households. It is to be noted that the same set of villages, household and individual level questionnaires were canvassed again in 2009-10 as in the year 2007-08. Apart from household level information, individuals within the households were also interviewed. The data include information on personal attributes of household's head, social group, occupation, landholdings, income and expenditure, household size, NREG participation 3 , type of ration card, PDS participation along with other village and individual level information.
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Apart from these questionnaire based information, detailed ethnographic interviews were conducted in 2008-9 in the period between the first and second surveys. About 20-25 respondents belonging to a cross -section of villagers and block level officials/political leaders were interviewed in a subset of eight villages selected according to the political affiliation of the village president (sarpanch). Since the sarpanch is elected along nonpolitical party lines, we found his/her political affiliation during the larger household survey. Fifty percent of the villages had sarpanches affiliated to one party, and the other half were affiliated to the opposing party. Two trained interviewers in each state team who spoke the local language and were cognizant of the requirements of ethnographic research conducted the interviews. The interviews contain anecdotes and examples of corruption, the decision making process of the panchayat (village governing body), the process of choosing NREG projects, the influence of political parties on village level issues, the migration rates and agricultural wages in the village, the impact of caste and income on the ability to influence decisions, the information available to the respondent about the NREG, and awareness of social audit, right to information, among others. 5 We also conducted focus group sessions in 25 worksites per state. These ethnographic interviews provide us with the perceptions of the beneficiaries, policymakers and village level elites on the dynamics of power and the impact of the NREG.
3 A household is said to be a NREG participating household if at least one of its individual member has worked for some time under NREGS in the last 365 days. 4 A household is said to be PDS participating household if it has draws foodgrain (rice or wheat) or sugar or kerosene from PDS 5 The interviewees included the village sarpanch, ex-sarpanch, deputy sarpanch, gram sevak, NREG assistant, caste leaders, panchayat members, village development committee members, political activists from the leading parties, NGOs in the village, the Patwari, moneylender, ration shop owner, worksite supervisor, NREG beneficiaries at the worksite, and individual asset creation beneficiaries. At the block level, we interviewed the Block Development Officer, the NREG program officer, the junior engineers, ward panchayat members, and the Pradhan. We also interviewed the member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA). The results are depicted in Table 2 . Table 2 here.
III. Results

Contrast between 2007-08 and 2009-10
The top panel of Table 3 here.
In Table 3 Based on this classification, we define four types of households: Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV households. The percentage distribution of these households is shown in Figure 1 . Table 4 here.
Both row and column percentages are reported. However, we comment only on row percentages. Key observations are as follows:
In both female and male headed households, the proportion of Type IV households is the highest. However, while the proportion of Type II households is the second highest among former, Type I households comes second in the latter. While Type IV households are in majority among SCs, STs and OBCs households, among 'others' social group the proportion of Type I is the highest. Going by poverty status of the households in 2007-08 and 2009-10, we observe that while among acutely poor, moderately poor (hence, among all poor) and moderately non-poor households, the proportion of Type IV households is the highest, among affluent and non-poor at large, proportion of Type I households is the highest. The majority of the landless households are Type I households. Among households with land holdings >0-<5 acres, the proportion of Type IV households is the highest. However, majority of those with land holding >5 acres in 2007-08 were Type I households.
We then investigated whether households who moved out of the NREGS are better off. To determine this, we see how distribution of CPIAL adjusted income net of NREGS and PCME change over this period. This is documented in Table 5 . Results are also supplemented by Stochastic Dominance test (Atkinson, 1987) . 8 In this test, cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of PCME/PCMINNE separately for two years are plotted for all the four type of households. If the cumulative income distributions functions for year 2007-08 lies above that of year 2009-10 over the complete range of poverty thresholds, the first-order dominance (FOD) holds. This implies that the targeting of the former is better in terms of a class of poverty indices comprising the head-count ratio, the poverty gap and a distributionally sensitive measure over the complete range of poverty thresholds (the Rawlsian maximin principle is a special case). If, however, the two curves intersect, a second-order dominance test is used that permits such comparisons for all such indices except the head-count index, and so on.
Our key conclusions are as follows. Both PCME and PCMINNE fell significantly over the period 2007-08 to 2009-10 for all four types of households. This is validated by means of statistical tests such as t-tests, signed rank tests and sign test (Table 5) . Stochastic dominance test confirms first order dominance implying that PCME in 2009 
Figures 2 to 9 here.
To measure changes in the per capita income over time, we construct two variables as follows: We define percentage increase in MPCE by subtracting its value for base year (2007-08) from the current year (2009-10) multiplied by 100 and then dividing by base year's value. Similarly, percentage increase in per capita income net of NREGS wage earnings over time by subtracting its value for base year (2007-08) from the current year (2009-10) multiplied by 100 and then dividing by base year's value. Then, we examine whether the 6 It tests the equality of matched pairs of observations by using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon 1945) . The null hypothesis under Wilcoxon signed-rank test is that distributions for both the years 2007-08 and 2009-10 are the same. 7 It tests the equality of matched pairs of observations. The null hypothesis is that the median of the differences is zero. 8 The test enables ordinal poverty comparisons for a range of poverty thresholds and a class of poverty indices.
households which never participated in NREGS have higher changes in the MPCE and per capita income net of NREGS wage earnings over time than those who withdrew in 2009-10, those who entered first time in 2009-10 and those who continued participation in 2009-10. To do this we rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors.
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Controlling variables other than dummy for types of household (Type I being the reference group) are dummies for social group of household (SC, ST, OBC vs. Others), household size for both base year and change in it (household size in 2009-10 minus household size in 2007-08) and initial year's per capita income. These models are validated by F-test at the 1 percent level of significance. We find that there is no significant difference in the percentage change in MPCE or PCMINNE for Type I and Type II households. This suggests that there isn't a significant increase in the income with respect to the initial year's income in those households which participated in 2007-08 but withdrew in 2009-10 and those who participated neither in 2007-08 nor in 2009-10. However, as compared to those households who never participated, percentage change (increase) in MPCE or PCMINNE is significantly lower for those who either entered first time in NREGS or who continued their participation. This indicates that households with lower change in income are more likely to join the scheme or continue their participation if already in the program. As expected, the higher the base year's per capita income, the lower is the percentage change with respect to the base year's per capita income. However, other control variables are insignificant.
We then investigated whether changes in the share of per capita income from agricultural and non-agricultural sources (net of NREGS earnings) lured or kept households from participation in NREGS. For this, we summarize some of the descriptive statistics (such as mean, standard deviation and median) for share of per capita income from agricultural sources (agriculture, live-stocks and agricultural wages) in total per capita income for base year 2007-08 and percentage change in the period 2007-08 to . We also summarize these descriptive statistics for share of per capita income from non-agricultural sources (nonagriculture wages, salary, self-employed business trade/artisans/professionals, and others such as pensions, remittances, rent, interest and dividends) in total per capita income for base year 2007-08 and percentage change in this between 2007-08 and 2009-10 with respect to 9 Another way to deal with this problem is to use Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) analysis. However, an essential assumption of ANOVA is the equality of variances of the dependent variable across the types of household. When this assumption is violated, the reported p-value from the significance test may be too liberal (yielding a higher than expected type I error) or too conservative (yielding a lower than expected type I error). In our analysis, Bartlett's test for equal variances suggests that variances are significantly unequal (results are not reported here but can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request). As a remedy of violation of this assumption, W and F * robust one way ANOVA is performed. Both w-test and F * are more robust to violations of homogeneity of variances than tradition F-test. However, commands for these tests in STATA do not permit any types of sampling weights and therefore, we rely on OLS regression with robust standard errors. base year. A positive value of these changes indicates increases and negative changes reductions in the share over time. Table 7 reports descriptive statistics and pair-wise comparisons of means for these shares and percentage changes in these. Table 7 here. Now, to examine significance of differences of means pair-wise among four types of households in these shares as well as percentage changes in them, we employ Bonferroni multiple-mean comparison test used along with one-way ANOVA. Table 8 depicts t-statistics for the multiple comparison tests for the means of shares and their changes from bothagricultural and non-agricultural sources. Table 8 here.
Our key conclusions are as follows. In the base year (2007-08) the mean share of per capita annual income from agricultural sources in total per capita income for all other households as compared to the households who never participated, were significantly higher. Further, as compared to the households who participated in 2007-08 but withdrew in 2009-10, mean share of per capita annual income from agricultural sources in total per capita income for those who participated first time in 2009-10 and continued participation in 2009-10 were significantly higher. However, mean share of per capita annual income from agricultural sources in total per capita income is higher for those who continued participation in 2009-10 as compared to first time participating households.
As far as mean percentage change (increase) in the household's share of per capita income from agricultural sources is concerned, as compared to never participating households, it is significantly higher for those who ceased participating, but significantly lower for those who participated for the first time in 2009-10 and those who continued participation. Further, as compared to those households who withdrew, there were significantly lower mean percentage changes (increase) in the household's share of per capita income from agricultural sources for those who enter first time and for those who continued participation in NREGS. Between those who participated for the first time and those who continued participation, mean percentage change (increase) in the household's share of per capita income from agricultural sources is significantly higher for latter.
In the base year (2007-08) as compared to the households who never participated, mean share of per capita annual income from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in total per capita income for all other households were significantly lower. Further, as compared to the households who participated in 2007-08 but withdrew in 2009-10, mean share of per capita annual income from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in total per capita income for those who participated first time in 2009-10 and continued participation in 2009-10 were significantly lower. Also, mean share of per capita annual income from nonagricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in total per capita income is lower for those who continued participation in 2009-10 as compared to first time participating households.
As far as mean percentage change (increase) in the household's share of per capita income from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings is concerned, as compared to never participating households, it is significantly higher for those who withdrew and those who continued their participation but significantly lower for those who participated first time in 2009-10. Further, as compared to those households who withdrew, there were significantly lower mean percentage change (increase) in the household's share of per capita income from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings for those who enter first time and for those who continued participation in NREGS. Between those who participated for the first time and those who continued participation, mean percentage change (increase) in the household's share of per capita income from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings is significantly higher for latter.
Thus, our results strongly suggests that there is a significant reduction in the share of per capita income from both agricultural as well as non-agricultural sources net of NREGS wages among those households who participated either for the first time in NREGS or those households who continued their participation, as compared to those who never participated or withdrew after initial participation. Also, mean shares of per capita income from both sources (those who never participated and those who withdrew after initial year's participation) significantly increased from 2007-08 to 2009-10.
IV. Determinants of Switches into and out of NREGS The Model
We constructed an estimation equation for the four types of households. 
Thus every sub-vector of  enters every marginal effect, both through the probabilities and through the weighted average that appears in j  .These values can be computed from the parameter estimates and standard errors are computed using the delta method.
Econometric Results
The estimation results are given in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 contains coefficient estimates. Note that the base (reference or omitted) case is Type I households, leaving Type II, III and IV households for detailed analysis. The model specification is validated by Wald chi-square statistics at 1 percent level of significance. Table 10 reports their corresponding marginal effects. As the latter are more meaningful, we shall confine our comments to the latter.
(1) Type I households As compared to others, the probability of never participating is significantly lower in SCs, STs and OBCs households. Higher land ownership in the base year increases the likelihood of never participating in NREGS. However, increase in land holding over time does not have a significant effect. Ratio of village level NREG to agricultural wage rates in the initial year reduces the probability of never participation in NREGS. However, increase in the ratio does not have a significant effect on it. Increase in the village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in the base year increases the probability of never participation under NREGS. However, percentage change in village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in current year relative to the base year does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of never participation. Effects of household composition in terms of share of adults (both initial percentages and change) and village distance from the NREGS work sites in 2007-08 are not statistically significant.
(2) Type II households
The likelihood of a household to withdraw from NREGS is significantly higher if they are from SCs, STs and OBCs social groups as compared to others. This means that as compared to others SCs, STs and OBCs are more likely to withdraw from NREGS participation after participating in 2007-08. Household composition in terms of proportion of adults and land ownership of households (both initial and change) do not have a significant effect on the probability of moving out from NREGS participation after participating initially. Higher initial year's ratio of NREG to agricultural wage rates in a village increases the likelihood of its households to withdraw from NREGS participation in the current year. However, change (increase) in the ratio does not have a significant effect. Increase in the village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in the base year also increases the likelihood of the households to withdraw from the NREGS after participating in initial years. However, percentage change in village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in current year relative to the base year does not have a significant effect on the probability of existence of Type II households. Initial year's village distance from the NREGS work sites is not statistically significant.
(3) Type III households
There is no significant difference in the likelihood of newly entered participating households (Type III households) among SCs, STs and OBCs as compared to 'others' social group. Also, household composition in terms of proportion of adults both initially and subsequent change does not increase or decrease the probability of first time entrance in NREGS. Increase in the household's land ownership in the base year (but not increase over time); increases the likelihood of a household to participate first time in the scheme. Though initial year's ratio of village level NREG to agricultural wage rates does not alter likelihood of a household to participate first time in the scheme significantly; increase in its value over time has significant and positive effect on the probability of a household to participate first time in the scheme. Similarly, initial year's village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings do not increase the likelihood of a household to participate first time in the scheme significantly. However, percentage change in village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in current year relative to the base year increases the likelihood of Type III households significantly. Initial year's village distance from the NREGS work sites is not statistically significant.
(4) Type IV households
As compared to 'others' social group, the probability of a household of continuing in the NREGS does not vary significantly for SCs, STs and OBCs. Also, increase in the proportion of adults in the household in initial year as well as increase over time does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of Type IV households. In contrast to those who participated for the first time in 2009-10, likelihood of a household continuing under scheme decreases significantly with increases in its initial year's land ownership. However, change in the land holdings over time does not change the likelihood of Type IV households.
Neither initial year's ratio of village level NREG to agricultural wage rates nor increase in its value over time have significant effects on the probability of household's continued participation. The higher the village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in the base year, lower is the probability of continued participation in NREGS. However, the percentage change in village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in current year relative to the base year does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of households to continue their participation in the scheme. Initial year's village distance from the NREGS work sites is not statistically significant.
In sum, the role of incentives in participation in NREGS is confirmed. Workers exit from NREGS when they see better economic opportunities elsewhere in the village economy while others enter the scheme because of the lure of remunerative wages.
V. Explaining the dynamics of participation and exit from the NREG
The ethnographic study conducted in the period between the first study and the panel study illuminates some of the perceived dynamics triggered by the NREG. The patterns that emerge from these interviews are consistent with the above analysis. This explains why those belonging to the type II households exited NREG in 2010. Exits could have occurred due to several reasons: a) Workers found more lucrative work as agricultural laborers. For instance, in Dharkada village, the worksite beneficiaries (women) said that the agricultural wages had increased from Rs 20-30 per day to Rs 60-70. The village president (Sarpanch) gave a higher figure (previously Rs 60-70 and now Rs 100). But both agreed that wages in the agricultural sector had increased as a result of NREG (to keep pace with the NREG wages). The perception in the villages is that NREG, whose wage rates are pegged to the statutory minimum agricultural wages, has been instrumental in increasing agricultural wages. In Gurari village, the supervisor on the worksite said that the wages for unskilled and skilled workers had increased to Rs 100 and Rs 125, respectively, and this was corroborated by the beneficiaries (who were interviewed separately), village elites (sarpanch, patwari, female panchayat representative ,among others) and government officals (development officer, Dharkada, Block Development Officer). A female panchayat samiti member in Dhundiya said that the wages of other jobs in the village too had increased by about 25% due to the NREG. In several villages the refrain was that workers were not willing to come and work on the site for several reasons including their ability to earn higher wages in farming and non-farm sector and their reluctance to engage in strenuous manual activity in the peak of summer. b) They worked on their own expanded land holdings. Our panel data (Table 4) shows that 30% of Type II households owned >1-<2 acres of land in 2007-8, and about 56% owned >2 acres, but in 2010, only 1% owned >1-<2 acres and over 70% owned more than 2 acres. These figures indicate that these households increased their ownership of land. However, since the numbers of acutely and moderately poor among these households also increased (though not as dramatically as for the Type III households), it is clear that ownership of land (especially if it is non-arable land) alone cannot lift a household out of poverty. Perhaps the explanation is as follows: In Rajasthan, the worksites functioned all year round, and not just in lean seasons. If the worksite was functional during the agricultural season, these Type II households (who had increased their landholdings) may have exited since they needed to work on their own lands and also needed to pay the hired workers. In the qualitative survey, several farmers complained that they were unable to get labor during the harvest season because of ongoing NREG work, and that the agricultural wages had gone up. For instance, the Deputy Sarpanch of Dharkada said that wage increases due to NREGS had fuelled labor shortages in other jobs. In order to pay for labor during harvests, these type II households could have augmented their income through non-farm jobs in construction sites and other work in nearby towns. c) Worked in non-farm jobs: The Type I and Type II households were more likely to live closer to markets (which we take as a proxy for a town) than the other two types of households. If we take the distance to the market as a proxy for distance to the nearest town, the figures show that for all three types of households, the distances to the nearest market have decreased. For instance, the distnace as 12.31 km in 2008 and is now 10.45 km for Type III households, while it was 10.15 km in 2008 and is now 9.28 km for Type 2 households. Type I and Type II households are closer to the nearest market (7.24 and 9.28 km respectively) than Type III and Type IV households (10.45 and 10.70km respectively).
With the boom in the construction industry in the state since 2008, the opportunities for skilled and unskilled laborers increased and were more lucrative than working on the NREG. Type III households, on the other hand, were more likely to live further away from the market, had less connectivity, and less access to such jobs. These perceptions need to be examined more systematically.
Among Type IV households, the reasons for continuing to stay within the program can be traced to their use of NREGS as an additional source of income. A typical story of a Type IV household is as follows: One scheduled tribe beneficiary in Dharkada village said that he had 6 -7 Bigha land on which he sowed corn during the monsoons. For rest of the year, his land was fallow as there was no water available for irrigation. His two sons were sitting idle at home, and earned intermittently through manual labour to meet household expenses. The entire family lived in a thatched (kutcha) house. "Under this (NREGS) scheme, the Panchayat selected us and got us a job card, and my sons got work. As an individual beneficiary, a new well was constructed. 10 This will enable me to grow more crops as water has become available from the well. Today, the condition of my house is better. Under this scheme, employment is available within the village, and day-to-day expenses are met. Now we sow foodgrains in our land, and eatable grains are produced there. We don't have to go out to earn as work is available in the village for the poor people. Because of this, condition of poor people like us has improved. As a result, we want Government should always continue this scheme, so that poor illiterate persons can maintain their families from wages earned from the scheme." This story seems to be that of a type IV household that has seen a marginal improvement in its circumstances from the NREG. The figures from the website of the Rajasthan government on the NREG indicate an increase in individual beneficiary schemes. About 113468 projects were taken up in 2008-9 for land development and provided irrigation facilities to those who owned land and qualified as individual beneficiaries and increased to 156468 projects in 2010-11.
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10 The government increased its emphasis on the individual beneficiary scheme from 2008. Under this scheme, a part of the NREG funds were set aside to develop productive assets on the lands of individual beneficiaries. 'We want to make the poor people more self sufficient through this scheme by creating productive assets on their lands,' said one senior officer in Udaipur.The NREG funds provided irrigation facilities on lands owned by SC, ST, BPL and beneficiaries of land reforms and Indira Awaas Yojana. 11 http://164.100.12.7/Netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr_dmu.aspx?state_code=27&flag=21&page1=D&month =Latest&fin_year=2008-2009 (Accessed 12 th January 2011).
Another perception of the interviewees in several villages was that migration had reduced since 2007-8. ' Earlier members of my family used to go to Jaipur for work, but now they don't go anymore because of NREG,' said one worksite beneficiary from Dhundiya village. Similar sentiments were expressed by government officials, political leaders and village elites. Previously, before the NREG, the villagers (including boys and girls from the age of 14) used to go to the cities or work on farms to earn a livelihood, said the worksite interviewees in Dharkada (all women and belonging to a scheduled tribe). However, in Kota (an ST village), the former sarpanch said that migration continued and had not reduced while the sarpanch said that it had reduced. The BDO explained that men from this and other villages went to Udaipur to work while the women stayed back and worked in the NREG. If we combine this with our panel data in Table 4 which reveals that almost 50% of Type III households belonged to Scheduled Tribes, and were first time entrants into the NREG, the story that emerges is one where females were sent to NREG worksites while males went to find better paying jobs in the city. However, since all these are based on perceptions, we need to assess whether the migration has actually reduced, and if so, is it because people prefer to work in NREG projects or is it because there has been an expansion of lucrative non-NREG (farm and non-farm jobs) in the villages.
What is clear from the ethnographic survey is that the general perception is that the NREG has increased wage rates in other jobs (farm and non-farm).
VI. Conclusions
Using household level panel data for the Indian state of Rajasthan this paper has considered the important issue of how the benefits in terms of employment and earnings from a workfare program vary over time. It has described movements in and out of the NREGS for various groups of households in the sample as well as the impact such transitions have on earnings. We also model the determinants of such transitions; and the dynamics of participation and exit from the NREGS. Hence, this paper provides the first systematic analysis of the dynamics of entry, participation in and exits from the NREGS. Several policy conclusions follow from our analysis. 
APPENDIX
